Home › Topics › Government › Government ethics › Public office and private gain › Public office should not be usable for priv… › Belief: Requiring the president and members of Congress to publish…
Belief
Requiring the president and members of Congress to publish their tax returns would reduce the use of public office for private gain. 0.50 Agree Disagree
Every president from Carter through Obama published tax returns without a law requiring it.
Would requiring the president and members of Congress to publish their tax returns reduce the use of office for private gain, or expose spouses and partners for little in return?
One belief, both sides, ranked by how well the arguments hold up rather than how often they are repeated. Permanent, and open to revision by anyone with a better argument.
If you disagree, this page has a column for you. A study, record or dataset for “A return shows what the financial disclosure form does not: exact income and its character, foreign income and foreign tax credits, business losses carried forward, charitable giving, and the rate actually paid”, which rests on argument alone.
Argument TreesHow arguments are scored →
Reasons to agree
Reasons to disagree
Weight for 0.00 · weight against 0.00 · net +0.00
Each reason is a claim with its own page. Score = sign x (2 x Truth - 1) x Conf x Link x Imp x Uniq, and every column is here so the row can be multiplied out and checked. A reason argued false scores negative and counts against the side it is filed on; a reason nobody has argued yet scores exactly 0, and so does one whose own page has no work behind it.
Wording overlap, unarguedOfficials who published their tax returns voluntarily were later found to have used their office for private gain less often than comparable officials who did not publish against Officials who published their tax returns voluntarily faced ethics findings for using their office for private gain just as often as officials who kept their returns private (0.52 alike)
What Would Change the AnswerTruth scores →
Not shown: 19 further inputs, each moving it less than any row shown
Every claim beneath this page held at false and then at true, one at a time, with the whole graph recomputed each time. "If false" and "if true" are where this page’s truth score lands; "Move" is how far apart they are. "If settled" is that same distance with the input’s confidence held at 1, which is what it would be worth once the work behind it is finished, so the gap between Move and If settled is the value of doing that work. This is one input at a time and finds single points of failure; it does not test several inputs moving together, which is how correlated assumptions actually fail.
Evidence LedgerHow evidence is scored →
Supporting
| # | Finding | Bears on | Starts at | Truth | Conf | Link | Imp | Score | EVS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | The mandatory IRS audit of presidential returns was "dormant, at best," and the audit of the 2015 and 2016 returns opened on April 3, 2019, the day the committee requested them; only 2016 was completed in office. House Ways and Means Committee report and release of tax years 2015 to 2020, December 2022 Rests on: Primary official record: statute, judicial holding, agency rule, sworn filing, no independent replication recorded | this belief | 0.95 | 0.95 | 0.56 | 1.00 | 0.50 | +0.25 | 0.90 |
| 2 | Nixon released his returns in December 1973 and asked the Joint Committee on Taxation to review them; the review found roughly $465,000 in back taxes owed. Joint Committee on Taxation review, April 1974 Rests on: Primary official record: statute, judicial holding, agency rule, sworn filing, no independent replication recorded | this belief | 0.95 | 0.95 | 0.56 | 1.00 | 0.50 | +0.25 | 0.90 |
Weakening
| # | Finding | Bears on | Starts at | Truth | Conf | Link | Imp | Score | EVS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | The public financial disclosure form already requires assets, income sources, liabilities, positions, agreements and gifts, reported in value ranges. Office of Government Ethics, Public Financial Disclosure Guide (2024) Rests on: Primary official record: statute, judicial holding, agency rule, sworn filing, no independent replication recorded | this belief | 0.95 | 0.95 | 0.56 | 1.00 | 0.50 | -0.25 | 0.90 |
| 2 | A state law requiring five years of returns from presidential primary candidates was struck down unanimously on state constitutional grounds. Patterson v. Padilla, California Supreme Court, November 21, 2019 Rests on: Primary official record: statute, judicial holding, agency rule, sworn filing, no independent replication recorded | this belief | 0.95 | 0.95 | 0.56 | 1.00 | 0.50 | -0.25 | 0.90 |
Weight for 0.51 · weight against 0.51 · net +0.00
Evidence Verification Score 3.60 · supporting 1.80 · weakening 1.80. 4 have no replication count recorded, so each counts as one study.
Findings that can fail empirically. Each has its own page where its accuracy is argued; the source is shown under it. Bears on says which claim the finding is filed under: this belief, or one of its reasons, in which case it reaches this page through that reason's truth score and is counted there. “Starts at” is where a finding's page begins before anyone argues with it, set by what kind of source it is, how many independent replications exist and how many of them agreed. A finding nobody has classified starts at 0.50, and at 0.50 it contributes nothing however often it is listed.
Falsifiability TestEvidence and predictions →
Evidence that would strengthen
Evidence that would weaken
Evidence rarely proves or disproves anything outright; it strengthens or weakens. These are the strongest realistic score-movers in each direction, stated like a bet: what result, from what kind of source, by when. Where a row has its own page, Score is that page's truth: if this evidence appeared, would it actually move this belief?
Testable PredictionsEvidence and predictions →
Follows if the belief is true
| Prediction | Truth | Conf | Link | Imp | Contrib. | At stake |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Within two election cycles of a publication requirement, at least one significant undisclosed foreign income source or lender relationship is found in a published return. By when, and how it is checked: By 2032; published returns compared against the same officials' disclosure filings | 0.50 | 0.26 | 1.00 | 0.50 | +0.00 | 0.13 |
Follows if the belief is false
| Prediction | Truth | Conf | Link | Imp | Contrib. | At stake |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Published returns add nothing to what the disclosure form already showed, and no conflict is identified from a return that the form had not already flagged. By when, and how it is checked: By 2032; independent review of both documents for the same officials | 0.50 | 0.26 | 1.00 | 0.50 | -0.00 | 0.13 |
Prediction contribution +0.00 · points at stake 0.26 · 100% of predictions are diagnostic and dated
If this belief is true, what should the world show that it would not show otherwise; if false, what instead? Result so far is the prediction's own page: pending at 0.50, and moving as it comes true or fails. A pending prediction contributes nothing yet; At stake is what it would contribute once settled.
Objective Criteria
| Proposed criterion, and the reading each side predicts | Score | Validity | Reliability | Linkage | Importance | Latest reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The number of income sources, lenders and business interests that appear on an official's published tax return but not on the same year's financial disclosure form is a fair measure of whether tax returns add conflict-relevant information. How it is measured: For every official who has published returns, compare each return, line by line, with the financial disclosure form filed for the same year. Count the foreign income sources, lenders, partnerships and business interests that appear only in the return. A reading that would strengthen the belief: Most published returns show at least one foreign income source, lender or business interest that the disclosure form left out or hid inside a broad category. A reading that would weaken it: Published returns almost never show a conflict-relevant item that the disclosure form had not already listed. | 0.50 | High | High | High | High | not yet read |
| The number of ethics complaints, investigations and news reports that cite information found only in a published tax return is a fair measure of whether anyone acts on what publication shows. How it is measured: Over the election cycles after a publication requirement takes effect, count House and Senate ethics complaints, inspector general referrals and major news investigations about officials' finances, and record which of them rely on a fact that came from a published return rather than from the disclosure form. A reading that would strengthen the belief: A steady share of complaints and investigations each cycle rests on facts that came from published returns. A reading that would weaken it: Published returns are rarely or never the source of a complaint, investigation or news report that the disclosure form could not have produced. | 0.50 | Medium | Medium | High | High | not yet read |
| The change in officials' foreign income and outside business income after a publication requirement takes effect is a fair measure of whether publication changes how officials handle their money. How it is measured: Compare the outside and foreign-source income reported by the president and members of Congress in the terms before and after the requirement, against a comparison group of officials who are not covered, such as state legislators in states without a similar rule. A reading that would strengthen the belief: Covered officials reduce foreign income and outside business dealings tied to matters they vote on, more than the comparison group does. A reading that would weaken it: Covered officials show no change, or they move the same income into trusts and business entities whose returns are not published. | 0.50 | Medium | Medium | Medium | High | not yet read |
Pick the yardstick before you look at the reading. Each criterion is itself a claim with its own page, and a good one is one where supporters and opponents predict different readings; a criterion both sides expect to come out the same way tests nothing. Validity: does it measure what is claimed? Reliability: would two observers get the same reading? Linkage: how directly does the reading bear on this belief? Importance: how much does the conclusion move once the reading is in? The Latest Reading column is the open invitation: it stays blank until somebody fills it with a sourced number.
What Acting On This Would Cost and GainCost-benefit analysis →
Benefits
| Claim | Estimate | Range | Likelih. | Exp. value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Foreign income and lender relationships become visible without a subpoena. Measured in: number of previously unreported foreign income sources identified per official | 1.00 | none stated | 0.50 | 0.50 |
| Voters can judge an official's financial entanglements before voting rather than after an investigation. Measured in: percentage points of voters reporting they have enough information to judge | 10.00 | none stated | 0.50 | 5.00 |
| The audit of the president stops depending on an agency the president appoints. Measured in: share of presidential tax years reviewed on schedule | 100 | none stated | 0.50 | 50.00 |
Costs and risks
| Claim | Estimate | Range | Likelih. | Exp. value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Spouses, children and business partners have their finances published without holding office. Measured in: number of non-officeholders whose finances are exposed per filing | 4.00 | none stated | 0.50 | 2.00 |
| Officials structure their finances to look unremarkable rather than to be efficient. Measured in: dollars of avoidable tax and restructuring cost per official per term | 15,000 | none stated | 0.50 | 7,500 |
| Returns are read as scandal rather than as data, and complex but lawful items are litigated in public. Measured in: number of contested public interpretations per published return | 6.00 | none stated | 0.50 | 3.00 |
Net by category
| Units | Benefit EV | Cost EV | Net |
|---|---|---|---|
| number of previously unreported foreign income sources identified per official | 0.50 | 0.00 | +0.50 |
| percentage points of voters reporting they have enough information to judge | 5.00 | 0.00 | +5.00 |
| share of presidential tax years reviewed on schedule | 50.00 | 0.00 | +50.00 |
| number of non-officeholders whose finances are exposed per filing | 0.00 | 2.00 | -2.00 |
| dollars of avoidable tax and restructuring cost per official per term | 0.00 | 7,500 | -7,500 |
| number of contested public interpretations per published return | 0.00 | 3.00 | -3.00 |
Who gains, who pays (by interest)
| Interest | Benefit EV | Cost EV | Net | Units |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voters need enough information to judge whether an official is compromised. | 5.50 | 3.00 | mixed units | mixed |
| Citizens need government decisions made on the merits rather than on what enriches the decider. | 50.00 | 0.00 | +50.00 | share of presidential tax years reviewed on schedule |
| Officials and their families need the same property rights and privacy as other citizens. | 0.00 | 7,502 | mixed units | mixed |
Short-term against long-term
Short-term (0 to 2 years)
| Within the first year of a tax return publication requirement, the House and Senate ethics committees receive complaints that cite information taken from published returns. | 0.50 |
Long-term (5 years and beyond)
Not the cost of the belief being true, but of doing what it implies: who gains, who pays, in what units, and how likely. Every cost and benefit is a claim with its own page, so Likelihood is that page's truth score. The estimate and its range are the only typed numbers in the system, in the row's own units; a row that states one figure and no range is marked, because a single number is not an estimate a decision can be checked against.
Logical AnatomyAssumptions →
Logical form (Returns contain conflict-relevant information the disclosure form lacks) AND (publishing it changes behavior or enables a check) AND (a publication requirement can be imposed). The first is documentary, the second is contested, the third is narrower than the usual objection assumes.
| Component claim | Type | Stated? | Load bearing | Truth | What it silently assumes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax returns contain conflict-relevant information that the financial disclosure form does not. | Empirical | Y | Yes | 0.50 | Assumes foreign income, lender identity and income character are conflict-relevant |
| Publication changes what officials do, or lets someone act on what it shows. | Causal | N | Yes | 0.50 | Assumes someone with the power to act reads and responds to the disclosure |
| A federal publication requirement for officeholders can be enacted and would survive review. | Definitional | N | Yes | 0.50 | Assumes a duty on officeholders differs from a condition on ballot access |
Weakest load-bearing component 0.50 · product of load-bearing truths 0.12 · argued truth 0.50 · truth score 0.50
One sentence is usually several claims. The truth score other pages read cannot exceed the weakest load-bearing component that has its own page.
Interests, Not PositionsConflict resolution framework →
Shared values, different rankings
| Value | Supporters rank | Opponents rank | Gap | Why the rankings differ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Transparency | 1 | 3 | 2 | Supporters treat publication as the default for public power; opponents treat it as a burden requiring justification. |
| Privacy | 3 | 1 | 2 | Opponents extend it to the official's family; supporters confine it to people who did not take the office. |
Interests of each side
Interests of supporters
| Interest (a need; its page argues validity) | Validity | Drives | Score | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voters need enough information to judge whether an official is compromised. Measured by: Share of an official's income sources, debts and foreign ties visible in public filings | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.25 | Accountability |
| Citizens need government decisions made on the merits rather than on what enriches the decider. Measured by: Share of official decisions made by an official holding a personal financial stake in the outcome | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.25 | Fairness |
| Investors need markets where nobody trades on information the government has not released. Measured by: Abnormal returns on officials' trades placed before government announcements | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.25 | Free enterprise |
| Officials need rules they can follow without a lawyer and without violating them by accident. Measured by: Number of inadvertent reporting violations per year | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.25 | Security |
Interests of opponents
| Interest (a need; its page argues validity) | Validity | Drives | Score | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Officials and their families need the same property rights and privacy as other citizens. Measured by: Whether a restriction reaches only the official or also family members who hold no office | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.25 | Liberty |
| Some officeholders want to keep using their position and their families to make money. Measured by: Income officials and their relatives earn from activities that depend on the office | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.25 | Status |
Primary conflict pair (computed: the interest with the highest Validity x Drives on each side) Voters need enough information to judge whether an official is compromised. (0.50 x 0.50) against Officials and their families need the same property rights and privacy as other citizens. (0.50 x 0.50). 50% of the paired weight sits on the supporting side. This is the one disagreement actually driving the debate: the product uses validity on purpose, so a cover story cannot lead a side and neither can a worthy need nobody is moved by. Validity is whether the need should be honored, argued on its own page and never by the power of who holds it; Drives is whether the need is really why this side holds its position, settled by what the side does. They are different numbers.
Shared interests
| Both sides want conflicts visible; they disagree about which document shows them. | Strengthen the disclosure form to require exact values, foreign income and lender identity, rather than publishing the return itself. | 0.50 |
Best compromise
| Require exact values rather than ranges on the disclosure form, add foreign income and lender identity, and require the president to publish returns while leaving members under the enhanced form. | Rests on Both sides agree the current ranges are too coarse to screen conflicts. Why difficult Officials would have to agree to disclose exact figures, which is the thing the ranges were designed to avoid. | 0.50 |
Dispute types
| Type | What exactly is disputed | What would move it |
|---|---|---|
| Empirical | Whether returns contain conflict-relevant facts the disclosure form lacks. | A line-by-line comparison of both documents for the same official, which the 2022 release makes possible. |
| Definitional | Whether "conflict" means an asset that could be affected or an income stream that was. | Score the two readings separately. |
| Values | Whether an officeholder's family keeps ordinary financial privacy. | A values ranking, not more data. |
| Linkage | Whether a state ballot-access ruling bears on a federal duty imposed on officeholders. | The linkage page for the constitutional argument. |
Obstacles to resolution
For supporters
| The requirement would be enacted by the officials it binds. | 0.50 |
For opponents
| Opponents have no answer to the audit failure other than trusting the same agency again. | 0.50 |
Cognitive biases
Affecting supporters
| Assuming that what is hidden must be damning. | 0.50 |
Affecting opponents
| Treating a document's complexity as a reason nobody should see it. | 0.50 |
Positions are what people say they want; interests are why. Each interest is a need with a subject (who needs what), and that one sentence is argued two ways that never borrow from each other. Validity asks whether the need should be honored, and is settled on the interest's own page by the mirror test: would the side accept the same need honored for its opponents, and what happens if everyone pursues it? Who holds the need, how many of them there are and how much power they have never count. Drives asks whether this need is really why the side holds its position, and is settled by the side's record, not its rhetoric (the scoring methodology calls it Linkage Accuracy). Score = Validity x Drives. A motive that is real and illegitimate stays in the table with its low validity: it is scored, not deleted, and the same suspicion applies to both sides.
Media ResourcesHow media is scored →
Supporting
Weakening
| Work | Type | Bears | Quality | Impact | Imp | Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, by Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider (2014) | Book | 1.00 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.50 | +0.00 |
| Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency, by Archon Fung, Mary Graham and David Weil (2007) | Book | 1.00 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.50 | +0.00 |
Each work has its own page where quality and impact are argued separately; whether it bears on this belief is a linkage page. Score = (2 x Quality - 1) x Bears x Impact x Imp, signed like every other row, so a work nobody has argued scores exactly 0. These rows are shown, not counted: the belief score above is arguments, evidence and predictions only, because a book is a container for reasons rather than a reason.
Legal FrameworkLaws that agree →
Supporting
| 26 U.S.C. 6103(f) lets the tax-writing committees obtain and, by vote, publish any return. | 0.50 |
Complicating
| 26 U.S.C. 6103 makes tax returns confidential as a general rule, with criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosure. | 0.50 |
Laws and rulings that assume the belief, and those that complicate it. Institutional agreement is a datum, not proof.
General to SpecificGeneral to specific →
Upstream
Supports the belief
| Public office should not be usable for private gain. | 0.50 |
Opposes the belief
| Nothing here yet. |
Upstream: the broader principles this belief inherits from. Downstream: the narrower beliefs that inherit from it.
Similar BeliefsOne page per belief →
More extreme
| All senior federal officials, including agency heads and judges, should publish their tax returns annually. | Equiv 0.50 | 0.50 |
More moderate
| Nothing here yet. |
Equiv is the truth score of an equivalence page. Near 1 means a merge candidate, not a new page.
Definitions
| Tax return | The complete federal return as filed, including schedules, and the returns of entities the filer controls where the proposal reaches them. |
| Financial disclosure form | OGE Form 278e, filed annually, reporting assets, income sources, liabilities, positions, agreements and gifts in value ranges. |
Terms the debate turns on, defined operationally.
People on the Record
On record agreeing
Who holds a belief never changes its score. These names carry history, not weight.
Where This Page Is Used
| Page | Table | As | Its truth |
|---|---|---|---|
| Public office should not be usable for private gain. | downstream beliefs | a row | 0.50 |
Every page that reads this one. One claim, one home, every use visible.
Related Beliefs
- Barring members of Congress and the president from owning or trading individual stocks would reduce the use of public office for private gain. 0.50
- Barring the president and members of Congress from giving any official government function to a family member would reduce the use of public office for private gain. 0.50
- Letting Congress overturn a presidential pardon by a two-thirds vote of both chambers would reduce the use of the pardon power for private gain. 0.50
- Public office should not be usable for private gain. 0.50
- Requiring the president and members of Congress to publish their tax returns would reduce the use of public office for private gain. (this page)
The other beliefs filed under Public office and private gain; this one is listed unlinked.
What this page needs right now
| # | The gap | Where it goes | Who is best placed to fill it |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A study, record or dataset for “A return shows what the financial disclosure form does not: exact income and its character, foreign income and foreign tax credits, business losses carried forward, charitable giving, and the rate actually paid”, which rests on argument alone | Evidence Ledger | anyone with the source |
| 2 | The first sourced reading of “The number of income sources, lenders and business interests that appear on an official's published tax return but not on the same year's financial disclosure form is a fair measure of whether tax returns add conflict-relevant information” | Objective Criteria, Latest Reading | anyone with the number |
Named gaps, read off the tables above, so a newcomer can see exactly where a contribution goes. None of them requires agreeing with the page, and each one links to the form it goes in.
What the numbers are made of
- Share on the agree side
- 50%
- Confidence
- 53%. Weakest parts: testability 0% · scrutiny 24%
- Depended on
- ReasonRank 0.0033, 3 of 2173
- Strongest reason for
- A return shows what the financial disclosure form does not: exact income and its character, foreign income and foreign tax credits, business losses carried forward, charitable giving, and the rate actually paid. +0.00
- Strongest reason against
- A return shows tax positions, not conflicts, and the disclosure form already lists assets, income sources, liabilities and positions in categories built for conflict screening. -0.00
- What would move this most
- Settling Tax returns contain conflict-relevant information that the financial…: 0.00 if false, 0.50 if true
- Prediction with the most at stake
- If true: Within two election cycles of a publication requirement, at least one significant undisclosed foreign income source or lender relationship is found in a published return. (0.13 points at stake)
- Net expected value
- mixed units, no single net: number of previously unreported foreign income sources identified per official +0.50; percentage points of voters reporting they have enough information to judge +5.00; share of presidential tax years reviewed on schedule +50.00; number of non-officeholders whose finances are exposed per filing -2.00; dollars of avoidable tax and restructuring cost per official per term -7,500; number of contested public interpretations per published return -3.00 · 6 of the 6 priced rows state a single figure with no range
- Kind of fight
- Factual dispute · evidence two-sidedness 100% · linkage leaning against relevance 0% · value-ranking gap 2.00 · ease of resolution 0.25
- Coverage
- Of 14 scored rows, 12 have no linkage page, 6 have no importance page, 14 have no uniqueness page. This page reads 63 other pages. 20 of them are one-sided or empty: The number of income sources, lenders and business interests that appear on an official's published tax return but not on the same year's financial disclosure form is a fair measure of whether tax returns add conflict-relevant information.; The number of ethics complaints, investigations and news reports that cite information found only in a published tax return is a fair measure of whether anyone acts on what publication shows.; The change in officials' foreign income and outside business income after a publication requirement takes effect is a fair measure of whether publication changes how officials handle their money.; A review of presidential tax returns released since the 1970s finds income sources or business dealings that did not appear on the same presidents' financial disclosure forms.; Officials who published their tax returns voluntarily were later found to have used their office for private gain less often than comparable officials who did not publish.; Officials who published their tax returns voluntarily faced ethics findings for using their office for private gain just as often as officials who kept their returns private.; After a tax return publication requirement takes effect, covered officials move their income into trusts and business entities whose returns are not published, so their personal returns show less than before.; Within the first year of a tax return publication requirement, the House and Senate ethics committees receive complaints that cite information taken from published returns.; Over a decade of required publication, whether a presidential candidate will release tax returns stops being a campaign issue because release happens automatically.; Over a decade of required publication, people with complicated foreign or business finances become less likely to run for Congress or the presidency.; Officials are less likely to use their office for private gain when they know the public can see where their income comes from.; Voters, reporters or ethics investigators will actually read published tax returns and act on what they find.; An official who is determined to profit from office can hide the gain in places that a personal tax return does not show.; Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon sponsored the Presidential Tax Transparency Act, a bill that would require presidents and major-party presidential nominees to release their tax returns.; Representative Anna Eshoo of California introduced the House version of the Presidential Tax Transparency Act, which would require presidents and presidential nominees to make their tax returns public.; California Governor Jerry Brown vetoed a 2017 bill requiring presidential candidates to release their tax returns to appear on the state ballot, writing that it might not be constitutional and asking what a state would require next.; Long-Concealed Records Show Trump's Chronic Losses and Years of Tax Avoidance, by Russ Buettner, Susanne Craig and Mike McIntire (2020); Lucky Loser: How Donald Trump Squandered His Father's Fortune and Created the Illusion of Success, by Russ Buettner and Susanne Craig (2024); More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, by Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider (2014); Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency, by Archon Fung, Mary Graham and David Weil (2007).
- Bottom line
- The documentary claim is the strongest part: returns do carry conflict-relevant facts the disclosure form omits. What nobody can show is that publishing them changes anything. All three load-bearing components sit at the neutral start, so what this page needs is not more evidence for the conclusion but an argument for each of its parts.
Structural Checks
| Finding | How serious | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| Rows that may be the same point twice | worth checking | 1 pair(s) of rows here read alike and no uniqueness page argues the overlap, so each is carrying its full weight. The measure reads wording, not meaning. |
| Costs and benefits given as single figures | worth checking | 6 of 6 priced rows state one number and no range. A decision cannot be checked against a point estimate: the reader cannot tell whether the net survives the estimate being wrong, which is usually the whole question. |
Faults the shape of the argument can show without reading a word of it: a claim used to support itself, a conclusion listed among its own premises, the same page counted twice. None of these changes a score. The wiki also specifies pattern-matching the prose for ten named fallacies; that is deliberately not done here, because a matcher looking for “attacking the person rather than the argument” would fire on the central legitimate argument on this whole site, and a score moved by a regular expression has no page to appeal to.
Scoring EngineTruth scores →
| Quantity | Value | How |
|---|---|---|
| Argument score | +0.00 | argument rows: weight for minus weight against |
| Evidence score | +0.00 | evidence rows: weight for minus weight against |
| Prediction contribution | +0.00 | prediction rows, same signed formula as every other row |
| Belief score | +0.00 | the three lines above added together |
| Positive total | 0.51 | every row whose signed contribution came out positive, from either side |
| Negative total | 0.51 | every row whose signed contribution came out negative, as a magnitude |
| Starting point | 0.50 | where this claim starts before any of its own rows count: Nothing observed: no source type recorded, so this claim starts at a coin flip |
| Weight of the starting point | 1.00 | k x a bounded reward for independent replication, k = 1, capped at 2.0 x k |
| Truth score, argued | 0.50 | (positive + weight x starting point) / (positive + negative + weight) |
| Truth score | 0.50 | argued truth, capped by the weakest load-bearing component that has its own page |
| ReasonRank | 0.0033 | how much of the site depends on this page: rank 3 of 2173. The share of a walk that starts at the 162 beliefs and steps to the pages they read, with a 0.85 chance of stepping on each time |
| Work value | 0.0016 | ReasonRank x (1 - confidence): how much settling this page would be worth to everything above it |
| Completeness | yes | at least one scored reason on each side (an importance page: at least one interest; an interest page: both readings filled) |
Cite this page Requiring the president and members of Congress to publish their tax returns would reduce the use of public office for private gain. Idea Stock Exchange, belief page requiring-president-members-congress, truth 0.50, confidence 53%, revision 42c8344 of 2026-10-04. The revision is what makes this quotable: these numbers move as the argument is worked on, and rebuilding that revision reproduces them exactly.
Every number on this page as data: requiring-president-members-congress.json. Constants: K = 1 · UNARG = 0.5 · DEFLINK = 1 · DEFIMP = 0.5 · DEFUNIQ = 1. A reason placed under a conclusion is presumed relevant until a linkage page says otherwise; the burden is on the challenger. The neutral start for importance, the wiki's own rule.
Every value here is computed from the tables above at build time. Nothing is typed.